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1 Introduction
In a single-unit assignment problem, a collectively owned set of indivisible objects are
to be assigned to a number of agents where each agent demands only one object, and no
monetary transfer is allowed. Student placement in public schools and university housing
allocation are two important examples of such assignment problems. Each agent has a strict
preference relation over the objects; and a mechanism specifies an assignment of the objects
to the agents for each preference profile.
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) introduce the notion of non-bossiness, which is
important in many assignment problems. A mechanism is non-bossy if no agent can change
the assignment of someone else without being affected by misreporting his preference. Besides
its theoretically appealing definition, it is also desirable due to normative and strategic
manipulation concerns.1
Even though the concept of non-bossiness has received much attention in the literature,2
it only considers “bossy” individuals, in other words, it does not capture the situations where
no individual is bossy but a group of agents. In the current study, we extend the concept of
non-bossiness to groups of agents and introduce the group non-bossiness notion. We say that
a mechanism is group non-bossy if no group of agents (including individual ones) can change
the assignment of someone else while theirs being unaffected by collectively misreporting their
preferences. First, we show that group non-bossiness is not equivalent to non-bossiness in the
sense that the latter does not imply the former. We, then, demonstrate that group strategy-
proofness is sufficient for a mechanism to be group non-bossy. As immediate implications of
this result, we obtain a characterization of the market structures in which the well-known
agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley (1962); hereafter, DA) is
group non-bossy; and another well-known one, top trading cycles mechanism (hereafter,
TTC), turns out to be group non-bossy.
The current study is important for at least two reasons. First, the concept of group
non-bossiness is theoretically interesting per se, as, in economics, it has been always desired
to understand the effects of groups of agents’ actions on the outcome in various settings.
Secondly, it gives a sufficient condition for group non-bossiness in terms of the well under-
stood group strategy-proofness property, which immediately enables us to have a say in the
group non-bossiness of some well-known mechanisms.
2 Model & Results
In a single-unit assignment problem, there are sets of agents N and objects O along with
the null object, denoted by ∅. Each agent i has a preference relation Ri, which is a strict,
complete, and transitive binary relation over O ∪ {∅}. We write aPib if aRib and a 6= b.
1The reader could refer to Kojima (2010) for a detailed argument on this point.
2Kojima (2010) shows that stability and non-bossiness are incompatible, and Matsubae (2010) extends
this result to a weaker version of non-bossiness, called “Non-damaging bossiness”. Papai (2000) proves that
the combination of strategy-proofness and non-bossiness is equivalent to group strategy-proofness; and Ergin
(2002) characterizes the market structures in which the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is
non-bossy. In the multi-unit assignment setting, Papai (2001) introduces the concept of total nonbossiness,
which is more stringent than non-bossiness, and characterizes the serial dictatorship rule in terms of it.
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Each object a ∈ O ∪ {∅} has a quota qa, and the null object ∅ is not scarce, i.e., |q∅| = |N |.
An allocation is an assignment of objects to agents such that each agent receives exactly one
object in O ∪ {∅},3 and each object is assigned to as many agents as at most its quota.
Let R = (Ri)i∈N be the preference profile of agents; and, for S ⊂ N , we write RS =
(Ri)i∈S for the preference profile of the agents in S. LetA andR denote the sets of allocations
and preference relations, respectively. A mechanism is a function ψ : R|N | → A.
Definition 1 (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981)). A mechanism ψ is non-bossy if, for
all i ∈ N , ψi(R′i, R−i) = ψi(R) implies ψ(R′i, R−i) = ψ(R) for all R′i ∈ R and R ∈ R|N |.
In words, a mechanism is non-bossy if no individual agent can ever change the assignment
of someone else without being affected by misreporting his preference. It only eliminates
bossy individuals, yet, there might be instances where no agent is bossy but a group of
agents. The following notion is a direct generalization of non-bossiness incorporating bossy
groups as well.
Definition 2. A mechanism ψ is group non-bossy if, for all S ⊂ N , ψi(R′S, R−S) = ψi(R)
for any i ∈ S implies ψ(R′S, R−S) = ψ(R) for all R′S ∈ R|S| and R ∈ R|N |.
The first question that should be answered is that whether group non-bossiness is equiv-
alent to non-bossiness. It is obvious that the former implies the latter, yet, the following
theorem shows that the converse is not true, which means that they are not equivalent.
Theorem 1. Group non-bossiness is not equivalent to non-bossiness.
Proof. For the proof, we need show that there exists a mechanism which is non-bossy but
not group non-bossy.
Let N = {i, j, k} and O = {a, b, c}, with qa = qb = qc = 1. We write top(Ri) for the best
choice of agent i with respect to preference Ri. Let define a mechanism ψ as follows:
ψ(R) = (ψi(R), ψj(R), ψk(R)) =

(a, b, c) if top(Ri) = top(Rj) ∈ {a, c, ∅}
(a, b, ∅) if top(Ri) = top(Rj) = b
(∅, ∅, ∅) otherwise
It is easy to verify that ψ is non-bossy. Yet, it is not group non-bossy. To see this, consider
two preference profiles R and R′ where top(Ri) = top(Rj) = a, and top(R′i) = top(R
′
j) = b.
Then, ψ(R) = (a, b, c) and ψ(R′) = (a, b, ∅), showing that ψ is not group non-bossy.
Definition 3. A mechanism ψ is group strategy-proof if there exist no S ⊆ N , R′S ∈
R|S|, and R ∈ R|N | such that ψi(R′S, R−S)Riψi(R) for all i ∈ S, and for some j ∈ S,
ψj(R
′
S, R−S)Pjψj(R).
3All the arguments carry over to the multi-unit assignment case where each agent might receive more
than one object. I will discuss this point in detail in Remark 1.
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Theorem 2. If a mechanism is group strategy-proof, then it is group non-bossy.
Proof. Let ψ be a group strategy-proof mechanism, and assume that it is not group non-
bossy. Then, this implies that there exist S ⊂ N , R′S ∈ R|S|, and R ∈ R|N | such that
ψi(R
′
S, R−S) = ψi(R) for all i ∈ S, but ψ(R′S, R−S) 6= ψ(R). Let A = {i ∈ N \ S :
ψi(R
′
S, R−S)Piψi(R)}.
If A 6= ∅, let i ∈ A. Then, however, the group of agents S ∪ {i} would manipulate
ψ by reporting false preference profile R′S∪{i} = (R
′
S, Ri), which contradicts ψ being group
strategy-proof.4
On the other hand, if A = ∅, then this implies that there exists an agent j ∈ N \ S
such that ψj(R)Pjψj(R
′
S, R−S) (since ψ(R) 6= ψ(R′S, R−S)). In this case, however, the grand
coalition N would manipulate ψ at the problem instance where the true preference profile
is R′ = (R′S, R−S) by reporting false preference profile R,
5 which contradicts the group
strategy-proofness of ψ.
Yet, group strategy-proofness is not necessary for a mechanism to be group non-bossy as
the following example shows.
Example 1. Let N = {i, j, k} and O = {a, b, c}, with qa = qb = qc = 1. Consider the
following mechanism ψ:
ψ(R) = (ψi(R), ψj(R), ψk(R)) =
{
(a, b, c) if top(Ri) = top(Rj)
(∅, ∅, c) otherwise
It is easy to verify that ψ is group non-bossy. However, it is not group strategy-proof,
as agents i and j would benefit from misreporting whenever (i) their top choices are not the
same, and (ii) each of them prefers any object in O to the null object.
One advantage of Theorem 2 is that it gives a sufficient condition in terms of group
strategy-proofness, which is well-studied in the literature. This makes us able to say some-
thing about the group non-bossiness of two well-known mechanisms: TTC and DA, which
are widely used for priority-based assignment problems.6 It is known that TTC is group
strategy-proof, hence, it is group non-bossy by Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. TTC is group non-bossy.
Ergin (2002) demonstrates that DA is separately group strategy-proof and non-bossy if
and only if the priority structure of objects is acyclic.7 Hence, this along with Theorem 2
enable us to characterize the market structures in which DA is group non-bossy.
Corollary 2. DA is group non-bossy if and only if the priority structure of objects is acyclic.
Remark 1. It is obvious that all the arguments except Corollaries 1&2 carry over to the
multi-unit assignment case as well, where each agent might receive more than one object. For
DA, on the other hand, Kojima (2011) shows that it is not even strategy-proof under acyclic
4Agent i would be strictly better off while all the other agents in S would not be affected by the misre-
porting.
5No agent in S would be affected by the misreporting. Whereas, all the agents in N \S would be at least
weakly better off while at least agent j would be strictly better off by the misreporting.
6In such problems, objects have priority orders over agents.
7In Ergin (2002), schools are the objects, and students are the agents.
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priority structures in multi-unit assignment problems. He recovers the strategy-proofness of
DA under the more stringent priority structures. Yet, it is not known whether it is also the
case for group strategy-proofness. On the other hand, for TTC, to my best knowledge, there
is no study investigating the group strategy-proofness of TTC in the multi-unit assignment
environment. Hence, as of now, the current paper does not have a say in the group non-
bossiness of TTC and DA in the multi-unit assignment setting.
Remark 2. It is easy to see that serial dictatorship, which is another well-known as-
signment mechanism where there is a fixed ordering of agents according to the which they
choose objects, is group non-bossy even in the multi-unit assignment case.
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